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What is the magnitude of credit constraint affecting small businesses? This paper 
provides estimate of the credit gap – defined as the difference between the desired and 
actual levels of debt for credit constrained small businesses.  The estimated credit gap is 
approximately 20 percent, i.e., credit constrained small business on the average would 
desire 20 percent more debt. This credit gap varies considerably across industries, with 
manufacturing firms facing a significantly larger gap than firms in the wholesale or 
service industries. 
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I.     INTRODUCTION 
 
A growing body of empirical literature on small business lending suggests that credit 
constraint affects a significant proportion of small businesses; yet there is no estimate on 
the magnitude of this constraint.
1
 The primary purpose of this paper is to estimate the 
magnitude of this credit constraint or credit gap (defined as the difference between the 
observed and the desired level of debt). Ideally measuring the credit gap involves 
identifying credit-constrained borrowers – i.e., borrowers that did not apply for a loan, 
fearing denial of application; firms that were unable to acquire the amount for which 
they applied; and small businesses that do not have credit in their balance sheets. Such 
data is rarely available for small businesses.  Fortunately, data from the National Survey 
of Small Business Finances (NSSBF, 1988–1989 and 1993) provide direct evidence on 
credit-constrained firms, i.e., firms that did not apply for a loan fearing denial and firms 
that were unable to acquire the amount for which they applied -- specifically questions 
J53 and J12 of the survey.  
In theory, a significant credit gap is expected for small businesses due to acute 
information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders. Under information 
asymmetries, the excess demand for credit is partly due to the fact that lenders are 
unable to identify (and charge higher rates to) high-risk borrowers (Stiglitz and Weiss 
(1981)). In equilibrium, lenders will resort to rationing credit than use the interest rate as 
a market-clearing device (i.e., charge the less creditworthy borrowers higher rates of 
interest to compensate for the credit risk). Petersen and Rajan (1995) describe how 
initial asymmetric information creates adverse selection and moral hazard problems in 
which banks charge high rates initially and reduce rates in later periods after borrower 
types have been revealed.  While anecdotal evidence on the severity of credit constraint 
among small business periodically surfaces in business press and policy discussions, 
evidence on the magnitude of this gap is nonexistent, mostly due to the absence of 
appropriate data.
2
 Our results indicate that on average, credit-constrained small 
businesses desire 20 percent more debt. While there is extensive empirical work on 
measuring the credit gap for households, to the best of our knowledge we provide the 
first evidence on the magnitude of credit gap at the firm level for small businesses (see 
Hayashi (1985), Jappelli (1990), Duca and Rosenthal (1993), and Cox and Jappelli 
(1993)) for empirical evidence on credit gap for households). Our study extends the 
liquidity constraint literature on households and on relationship lending to small 
business finances. 
Our empirical work highlights the importance of the selection biases inherent in 
quantifying desired debt.  Any attempt to estimate the desired debt requires identifying a 
subsample of firms that have positive debt and are unconstrained in the credit market.  
Extending the econometric findings to all small businesses, however, requires that we 
control for differences between firms that are credit constrained and those that are 
unconstrained, and firms that have debt and those that have no debt.
3
 Our estimates of 
sample selection term coefficients confirm that the subsample is indeed nonrandom, that 
unobserved factors which increase the probability of holding debt also increase the 
demand for desired debt, and that unobserved factors which increase the probability of 
being credit constrained reduce the demand for desired debt.   
Finally, we provide evidence on how credit gap varies by firm characteristics. For 
example, manufacturing, wholesale, and service firms experience the largest credit gap, 
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and utilities, insurance and mining firms appear to be unconstrained. We find that firms 
that employ between 50-99 employees have a larger credit gap than those that employ 
100-499 employees.  Similarly, C-corporations and S-corporations experience a greater 
credit gap than proprietary and partnership businesses. Also, unlike franchised firms, 
independent credit-constrained firms would have 21 percent more debt if credit 
constraints were removed. Because the magnitude of credit gap differs across firms, 
targeted policy intervention will become more effective as information on the magnitude 
of credit constraints among small businesses is made available (Gertler and Gilchrist 
(1994)). Information on credit gap will be instrumental in regulating the pool of funds 
designated to bank-dependent borrowers under a monetary policy as the “credit” or 
“lending” view would suggest.   
 
II.  BACKGROUND 
 
Why are small businesses more likely to be credit constrained? We examine this 
question and survey current empirical work on small business lending with an emphasis 
on how banks have developed mechanisms to address the issue of information 
asymmetry that may contribute to alleviating or somewhat mitigating credit constraint.  
Small businesses are generally characterized by the opacity of their operations. Their 
owners know more about their business prospects and often have no credible 
mechanisms to convey such private information to lenders (Leland and Pyle (1977)).  
Mitigating information asymmetry is beneficial both to banks and small firms, and over 
time, sophisticated screening and monitoring mechanisms have been developed by 
banks to address this issue. Collaterals and guarantees can be viewed as powerful tools 
that allow banks to offer credit on favorable terms to small businesses (Stiglitz and 
Weiss (1981), Bester (1985), Boot et al. (1991), and Diamond (1984)), and some of their 
contract features may reduce the cost of intermediation.  Banks also use restrictive loan 
covenants to address the information problem. Covenants force borrowers to renegotiate 
when a strategic opportunity to enhance the value of a loan arises or the financial 
condition of the firm changes (Berlin and Loeys (1988), Melnik and Plaut (1986), and 
Berlin and Mester (1993)), and prevent borrowers from engaging in risk-shifting 
behaviors. Loan maturity can also be used to complement covenants.  A sequence of 
short maturity loans forces firms to renegotiate contracts at expiration while covenants 
are renegotiated only if triggered by conditions enumerated and agreed upon.   
Another effective mechanism to ease the informational asymmetry is relationship 
lending. Relationship lending is a process in which banks, through continuous contact, 
gather private information over several years from a borrowing business (see Boot 
(2000)). This information is derived from repayment histories, periodic submissions of 
financial statements, renegotiations, visits to banks, and other data associated with 
ongoing monitoring. Banks that provide a host of services to a borrowing business may 
be able to complement the usual information on credit balance and transaction activity 
with payroll data and get a unique perspective on the business’s financial health.  
Information specific to owners can be garnered from the provision of personal loans, 
credit cards, deposit accounts, trust accounts, and investment services.   
Empirical evidence on the efficacy of relationship lending has been slow to 
accumulate, largely due to unavailability of reliable data on small business lending.  
Petersen and Rajan (1994) use the NSSBF (1988–1989) to examine benefits of the bank-
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firm relationship on credit availability among small businesses. They find that length of 
relationship has little impact on loan rates, but enhances the availability of funds.  In a 
similar spirit, Berger and Udell (1995) find that the length of relationship lowers both 
loan rate premiums above the prime rate and the probability of collateral use. Cole 
(1998) also examines the importance of bank-firm relationships to the availability of 
credit, and in several ways extends the works of Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Berger 
and Udell (1995). He finds that the previous use of a lender as a source of savings 
accounts and financial management service increases the likelihood of credit 
availability. Findings of Ongena and Smith (2001) from Norway suggest that benefits 
from the bank-borrower relationship may be inversely associated with the duration of 
relationship.  Elsas and Krahnen (1998) do not find any relation between loan price and 
length of relation for German midsized companies. Harhoff and Korting (1998) 
conclude that a long-lasting relationship and concentrated borrowing were beneficial to 
small and medium-sized enterprises in Germany. They also find that duration of 
relationship has no impact on the cost of line of credit financing. 
 
III.  EMPIRICAL MODEL 
 
We consider a firm as having its desired level of debt if it is not credit constrained and 
holds a positive level of debt (see Cox and Jappelli (1993)). We use the estimates of 
desired debt equation for these firms to forecast the desirable level of debt for credit-
constrained firms with positive demand for debt. The estimates are likely to be biased, if 
a variable that affects a firm being credit constrained or having positive debt also affects 
the desired level of debt.  For example, a firm with a better relationship with a lender 
may not only be less likely to be denied a loan but, relative to firms with similar 
prospects, may be able to borrow more.   
We adopt a three-step generalized regression procedure which is an extension of 
Heckman (1979) by Catsiapis and Robinson (1982), Ham (1982), and Tunali (1985) to 
account for two sources of selection bias, jointly determining inclusion in a subsample 
used in estimating the desired level of debt.  First equation represents the desired credit 
equation and the other two are Probit equations that describe the selection rules. For the 




































            (3) 
 
where *iY  is the desired debt for the ith firm, and is observed only for firms that are 
unconstrained and have positive levels of debt. X1i is a vector of credit-demand 
determinants, such as firm and owner characteristics and bank-firm relationship 
variables. The unobservable indices i and i determine whether a firm holds positive 
credit and whether a firm is credit constrained, respectively.   
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We define a firm to be credit constrained if it replied in the affirmative to one of 
the two following questions: (1) “With the most recent loan application, did a bank turn 
down the loan application or has the firm been unable to get as much as it applied for?” 
and (2) “During the past three years, were there times when the firm needed credit but 
did not apply because it thought the application would be turned down?”   
Following Cox and Jappelli (1993), we assume that the desired debt for a firm is 
observed if the demand for debt is positive and the firm is not credit constrained. X2i is a 
vector of credit demand determinants and convenience proxies of using credit, and X3i is 
a vector of credit demand determinants and credit constraint proxies.  Convenience and 
constraint proxies do not affect the desired debt but affect the probability of a firm’s 
holding credit and being unconstrained, respectively. From an empirical standpoint, our 
main result depends on the parameter estimates of equation (1). Estimates of equations 
(2) and (3) provide probabilities of small firms’ holding debt and being unconstrained, 
respectively.  These estimates are used to construct the selection terms (inverse Mills 
ratios) to estimate equation (1). The inverse Mills ratios from estimates of equations (2) 
and (3) are used to correct for sources of sample selection.   
The two latent variables i and i admit four categories of firms: (a) 
unconstrained firms with positive credit (i = 1 and i = 1), (b) unconstrained firms that 
choose not to hold credit (i = 1 and i = 0), (c) constrained firms with credit (i = 0 
and i = 1), and (d) constrained firms that do not hold any credit (i = 0 and i = 0).  
The estimation strategy is to use the first category (i = 1 and i = 1) of firms to obtain 
consistent estimates of the reduced form of desired credit, taking into account the two 
sources of sample selection.   
The expectation of desired credit for the first group of firms 
is )1,1|(EX)1,1|Y(E ii111ii
*
i  . We further assume that each error 
term is normally distributed with mean zero and variance 
2
i (i=1, 2, 3). Using the 
standard Probit normalization )1( 32  , one can obtain consistent estimates 
of
2 and 3 . The final estimation equation of 
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 ,          (4)
 
 
where )()( ii   and )()( ii  are the inverse Mills ratios. The (.) and (.) are 
the probability and cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution 
evaluated at the Probit.  The 12 and 13 are the correlation between 1 and 2, and 1 and 
3, respectively.  The probability of being in the sample is (i)* (i).   
Credit gap for a sample of firms is defined as the difference between the average 
desired debt ( *D ), and average actual debt as ( aD ).
4
 *cD  is the average desired debt of 




. Equation (4) provides the 
estimates for 1 , and cX , the mean of the vector of observable variables for the 
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constrained firms, is constructed from the NSSBF data set.  Credit gap is estimated as 






).   
 
IV.  DATA 
 
We use the data from the NSSBF (1993), a survey administered by the Federal Reserve 
Bank. The survey has 4,637 observations. It includes 3,355 firms with debt and 2,432 
firms that are credit constrained as previously defined. There are 2,196 firms that have 
debt and are credit constrained and 1,358 firms that have debt but are not constrained, 
while 372 firms have no debt but are constrained and 712 firms have no debt and are not 
constrained. After accounting for missing data, our final sample has 4,348 observations 
out of 4,637 original observations.
5
  
To estimate the credit gap, we first need to estimate equations (2) through (4), 
while controlling for the relationship, firm, and owner characteristics (Peterson and 
Rajan (1994), Cole (1998), and Berger and Udell (1995)). Creating a set of desirable 
variables to estimate equations (2) through (4) has been a considerable challenge.  Given 
the interrelationship between presence of credit constraint (equation (2)), incidence of 
debt (equation (3)), and the desired debt (equation (4)) it is important to isolate 
identifying variables – i.e., variables that affect one of the relationships identified above 
but not the other. We have created two sets of proxies – the constraint and the 
convenience – to address this issue.
6
  These proxies are far from optimal and at best can 
be considered adequate. Constraint proxies capture variables that may affect the 
probability of a firm’s being credit constrained. Data on trade credit denial and 
payments to partners are our constraint proxies.  Firms that have a history of trade credit 
denials may be more likely to be credit constrained, and firms with a history of 
significant payments to partners may be able to reschedule these payments and avoid 
being credit constrained.  Similarly, convenience proxies capture the likelihood of using 
debt - firms for which the “convenience” of using debt is relatively high. Data on a 
firm’s use of credit cards and the magnitude of internally available funds (the sum of 
retained earnings, and checking and savings account balances relative to assets 
(BALANCE)) are used as convenience proxies. Each of these variables makes it 
possible for firms to do business without borrowing from banks. 
We use data on all firms to estimate equations (2) and (3), and data on firms that 
have debt and are not credit constrained to estimate equation (4). Table 1 presents 
univariate summary statistics of firm, owner, and relationship characteristics, and 
constraint and convenience proxies for four regimes of firms – constrained and 
unconstrained firms with debt, and constrained and unconstrained firms without debt.  
Most firms have been in business for over eleven years, and the years of relationship 
with the primary lender and the percentage of firms with checking accounts do not differ 
substantially across the four regimes of firms. Sales average about five times total assets 
both for firms that hold debt and are credit constrained and for firms that have debt but 
are unconstrained. Sales are nearly eight times total assets for firms that do not have 
debt. Unconstrained firms with no debt hold significantly less liability than other groups 
of firms, while having much larger profit-to-asset ratio, compared with unconstrained 
firms with no debt, a greater proportion of other firms were delinquent on business 
obligations. Nearly half of the unconstrained firms with no debt are proprietary firms.  
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Table 1 
Firm, owner, and relationship characteristics and constraint/convenience proxies 
 




Holders Constrained  Unconstrained 
Total Number of Observations 4,348 3,355 993 2,432 1,916 
Ln (Assets) 12.14 12.48 10.96 12.57 11.58 
 (2.50) (2.21) (2.17) (2.32) (2.16) 
Liabilities/Assets 0.65 0.72 0.43 0.76 0.51 
 (1.35) (0.87) (2.30) (1.74) (0.55) 
Sales/Assets 5.75 5.05 8.11 5.33 6.29 
 (11.69) (10.21) (15.40) (11.01) (12.48) 
Profits/Assets 0.75 0.50 1.59 0.55 1.01 
 (4.67) (3.25) (7.61) (3.50) (5.80) 
Debt!!/Assets 0.51 0.51 0.00 0.55!! 0.45!!! 
 (0.68) (0.68)  (0.79) (0.46) 
Ln (Firm Age) 2.43 2.42 2.46 2.38 2.49 
 (0.81) (0.81) (0.82) (0.80) (0.82) 
Firm Delinquent 860 704 156 661 199 
Proprietary 1,330 877 453 597 733 
S-Corporation 1,056 873 183 642 414 
Corporation 1,646 1,367 279 1,025 621 
Independent 4,161 3,182 979 2,328 1,834 
Ln (Years of Experience) 2.81 2.81 2.81 2.79 2.84 
 (0.67) (0.65) (0.71) (0.65) (0.69) 
African-American Owners 395 280 115 269 126 
Female Owners 779 554 225 406 373 
Owner Delinquent (Personal) 541 414 127 396 145 
Owner-Manager 3,495 2,646 849 1,936 1,559 
Judgment Against Owner 226 178 48 168 58 
Owner Bankruptcy 119 90 29 64 55 
# of Financial Institution 2.39 2.60 1.67 2.73 1.96 
 (1.63) (1.68) (1.16) (1.79) (1.89) 
# of Services (Primary Lender) 3.29 3.64 2.13 3.85 2.59 
 (0.37) (0.36) (0.41) (0.33) (0.42) 
Ln (Years with Primary Lender) 1.85 1.82 1.92 1.76 1.96 
 (0.89) (0.88) (0.94) (0.87) (0.92) 
Checking Account 4,076 3,113 963 2,248 1,828 
Transaction Service 1,345 1,136 228 475 874 
Trust Service 835 675 130 289 540 
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Table 1 (continued) 
Constraint/Convenience Proxies 
Trade Credit Ever Denied 331 277 54 277 54 
Partners' Payment/Assets 0.36 0.28 0.61 0.26 0.48 
 (2.65) (1.67) (4.58) (1.43) (3.64) 
Credit Card - Business 1,430 1,183 247 910 520 
Credit Card - Personal 1,594 1,269 325 965 629 
BALANCEiv/Assets 0.67 0.52 1.16 0.50 0.88 
  (3.23) (2.04) (5.53) (1.91) (4.33) 
iDebt is defined as the combined amount of total loans, mortgages, notes, bonds and capital leases.   
ii Of 2,432 firms, 2,090 credit-constrained firms have positive amount of debt.  
iii Of 1,916 firms, 1,265 credit-constrained firms have positive amount of debt.  
ivBALANCE is a sum of checking and savings balances and retained earnings.   
Standard deviations are given in brackets. 
 
 
African-Americans own a large percentage of firms that are constrained and have no 
debt. Females own nearly one-fourth of all unconstrained firms with no debt. Owners 
who were delinquent on personal obligations own one-fourth of constrained firms with 
no debt. Constrained firms with debt receive more services from their primary lenders, 
more of them are likely to have trust services, and their checking and savings balances 
and retained earnings are nearly one and a quarter times the size of their assets. 
 
V.  ESTIMATION RESULTS 
 
Our empirical work provides estimates of equations needed to estimate credit gap and 
also highlights the effects of relationships on small business borrowing behavior in three 
different ways: (1) the probabilities of being credit constrained, (2) the incidence of 
debt, and (3) the demand for desired debt. Table 2 highlights the effect of lending 
relationships on a firm’s being credit constrained. At the mean value of years of 
relationship with a primary lender, a 1 percent increase in years of relationship lowers 
the probability of credit constraint by 2.1 percent. While older firms face a lower 
probability of being credit constrained by a magnitude of 2.7 percent, firms delinquent 
on business obligations increase their probability of being credit constrained by 15.4 
percent. Empirical results also indicate that owner characteristics such as judgments 
against an owner and owner delinquency increase the probability that firms will be 
denied credit by 10.6 and 8.9 percent, respectively.  Businesses owned by African-
Americans have a 12.3 percent greater probability of being credit constrained than other 
small businesses. Our result supports findings of Blanchflower et al. (1998) and  
Cavalluzzo and Cavalluzzo (1998) that African-American small businesses are more 
likely to face some type of discrimination than others are. The trade-credit-denied 
variable increases the probability of being credit constrained by 16.9 percent.   
Our results of incidence of debt Probit highlight the role of relationship (see 
Table 3). Using more services from the primary lender increases the probability of 
holding debt, and older firms are less likely to hold debt. The probability of holding debt 
increases with liabilities-to-asset ratio, and decreases by 0.2 percent with sales-to-asset 
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ratio. A greater profit as a percent of assets decreases the probability of holding debt by 
0.3 percent. We also find that firms owned by African-Americans and females have 
significantly lower probabilities of holding debt – 5.2 and 4.2, respectively. The 
coefficient on the dummy variable for personal credit cards used for business is 





Probit estimates: presence of a credit constraint 
 
 The dependent variable is 1 if the firm is credit constrained, 0 otherwise. The 
independent variables are firm, owner, and relationship characteristics and constrained 
proxies. The regression includes a constant. The marginal effects for dummy variables 
are the discrete change in them from 0 to 1, and for all other variables it is computed at 
their mean values. The following are the estimates of equation (3). 
 
  Coefficient SE Marginal Effect 
Firm Characteristics     
  Liabilities/Assets 0.229 *** 0.043  0.090 
  Sales/Assets -0.001   0.002 -0.001 
  Ln (Firm age) -0.068 * 0.037 -0.027 
  Profits/Assets -0.002  0.005 -0.001 
  Corporation  0.100 ** 0.044  0.039 
  Firm Delinquent 0.409 *** 0.063  0.154 
Owner Characteristics     
  Ln (Years of Experience) -0.048   0.039 -0.019 
  Owner-Manager 0.077   0.053  0.030 
  African-American 0.328 *** 0.078  0.123 
  Gender (Female Owner) -0.083  0.054 -0.033 
  Owner Delinquent 0.233 *** 0.076  0.089 
  Owner Bankruptcy -0.092  0.118 -0.036 
  Judgment Against Owner 0.281 *** 0.108  0.106 
Relationship Characteristics     
  Checking Accounts -0.101   0.090 -0.039 
  No. of Financial Institutions 0.002  0.017  0.001 
  Ln (Years with Primary Lender) -0.055 * 0.029 -0.021 
  No. of Services from Primary Lender 0.258 *** 0.016  0.101 
Constraint Proxies      
  Trade Credit Ever Denied 0.461 *** 0.098  0.169 
  Partners' Payment/Assets -0.019   0.014 -0.008 
Log likelihood -2,534     Pseudo R2 0.15 
Prob > Chi squared 0      Total observations 4,348 
*, **, and *** are significant at 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively. 
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Table 3 
Probit estimates: incidence of debt 
 
  Coefficient SE Marginal Effect 
Firm Characteristics     
  Liabilities/Assets 0.076   0.063  0.020 
  Sales/Assets -0.007 ** 0.003 -0.002 
  Ln (Firm Age) -0.080 * 0.044 -0.021 
  Profits/Assets -0.011 * 0.006 -0.003 
  Corporation 0.096 * 0.051  0.025 
  Firm Delinquent 0.057  0.069  0.015 
Owner Characteristics     
  Ln (Years of Experience) -0.057   0.044 -0.015 
  Owner-Manager -0.094  0.062 -0.024 
  African-American -0.184 ** 0.077 -0.052 
  Gender (Female Owner) -0.153 *** 0.057 -0.042 
  Owner Delinquency 0.020   0.079  0.005 
  Owner Bankruptcy  -0.041  0.135 -0.011 
  Judgment Against Owner 0.057  0.104  0.015 
Relationship Characteristics     
  Checking Accounts -0.183   0.115 -0.045 
  No. of Financial Institutions 0.059 ** 0.027  0.016 
  Ln (Years with Primary Lender) -0.005   0.034 -0.001 
  No. of Services from Primary Lender 0.296 *** 0.023  0.078 
Convenience Proxies     
  Credit Card/Business 0.001  0.052  0.000 
  Credit Card/Personal 0.152 *** 0.048  0.039 
  BALANCE/Assets -0.020   0.015 -0.005 
Log likelihood -1,971     Pseudo R2          0.16 
Prob > Chi squared 0     Total observations 4,348 




Our estimates of desired debt regression show that the length of relationship with 
a primary lender matters more than the firm’s age (see Table 4).
7
 One percent increases 
in the length of relationship with the primary lender increases the debt-asset ratio by 
three percentage points, while firm age does not have any significant effect. Though 
checking accounts do not affect the demand for debt, we find that using transaction and 
trust services decreases the demand for debt -- firms with deep pockets have less 
demand for debt.  We observe that larger firms are more likely to use these services and 
are less likely to have the need to finance investments.
8
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Table 4 
Ordinary least square estimates: determinants of firms' debt 
 
The dependent variable is the debt-asset ratio. The subsample includes observations on firms that 
have debt and are not credit constrained. The regression also includes seven industry dummies 
based on one-digit SIC code, and six of them are significant. The Mills ratios are computed from 
the Probit estimates of equations (2) and (3). The following is the estimate of equation (4). 
 
  Coefficient  SE 
Firm Characteristics    
  Log (Assets) -0.055 *** 0.007 
  Sales/Assets -0.003 ** 0.001 
  Ln (Firm age) 0.010  0.019 
  Profits/Assets -0.018 *** 0.003 
  C-Corporation -0.013  0.046 
  S-Corporation 0.022  0.047 
  Proprietary 0.008   0.046 
  Franchise 0.024  0.050 
  Firm Delinquent -0.428 *** 0.049 
Owner Characteristics    
  Owner-Manager -0.155 *** 0.030 
  African-American -0.580 *** 0.054 
  Asian/Pacific Islander 0.071 * 0.040 
  Gender (Female Owner) -0.064 ** 0.030 
  Owner Bankruptcy 0.082   0.066 
  Owner Delinquent -0.218 *** 0.049 
  Judgment Against Owner -0.291 *** 0.068 
Relationship Characteristics    
  Checking Accounts -0.038   0.049 
  No. of Financial Institutions 0.000   0.012 
  Ln (Years with Primary Lender) 0.030 * 0.017 
  Transaction Services -0.109 *** 0.030 
  Trust Services -0.145 *** 0.035 
Selection Term - Credit Constrained -3.037 *** 0.183 
Selection Term - Incidence of Debt 5.403 *** 0.474 
Total observations 1,265  R2 = 0.25 
*, **, and *** are significant at 10, 5, and 1 percent.  
 
 
Our results also suggest that both sources of censoring render the sample 
nonrandom. The sign pattern for the selection terms conforms our conjecture. The 
positive coefficient for the selection term for debt incidence implies a positive 
correlation between errors in the Probit for incidence of debt and the regression for 
desired debt. As expected, the results confirm that the unobserved factors that increase 
the probability of holding debt also increase the demand for desired debt. The 
coefficient on the credit-constrained selection term implies a negative correlation 
between unobservable variables in the Probit for being constrained and those in the 
regression for desired debt. Therefore, the unobserved factors that increase the 
probability of being credit constrained reduce the demand for desired debt. 
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Table 5 
Estimation of credit gap 
 
This table presents estimates of the credit gap for constrained firms with positive demand for debt.  
The magnitude of credit gap is desired debt as a percentage of actual debt (see Section VI for 
more details). The estimated credit gap is stratified by industries based on one-digit SIC code, 
number of employees, and forms and types of corporate governance. Desired debt is computed by 
multiplying predicted debt-asset ratios with total assets. 
 
  # of Firms Desired Debt1 Actual Debt1 Extent of Gap2 (%)  
Industry      
Mining 15 9,723 9,135 106%  
Construction 239    602    492 122%  
Manufacturing 311 3,006 2,053 146% *** 
Utilities & Transportation 99 1,281 1,917 67%  
Wholesale Trade 219 1,593 1,253 127% * 
Retail Trade 440 1,019    937 109%  
Insurance 124 1,594 1,594 100%  
Service 642    765    622 123% ** 
Firm Size by Employment       
0 - 19 1,107    207    234 89%  
20 - 49 254    787    716 110%  
50 - 99 361 1,875 1,421 132% *** 
100 - 499 327 5,064 4,250 119% ** 
Corporate Governance       
Proprietary 452    137    132 104%  
Partnership 146 1,651 2,309 72%  
S-Corporation 573 1,292 1,081 120% ** 
Corporation 919 1,952 1,469 133% *** 
Independent/Franchise       
Independent 1,986 1,330 1,101 121% *** 
Franchise 104 1,886 1,719 110%  
Overall 2,090 1,358 1,132 120% 
*** 
1The debt figures are in thousands of dollars.  2 The extent of credit gap is desired debt as a percentage of 
actual debt.  ***, ** and * signifying the difference between desired and actual debt is significant at 1, 5, and 10 
percent, respectively. 
Our estimates indicate that credit-constrained firms with positive demand for debt 
have an average desired debt of $1,357,701. Small businesses would acquire on average 
20 percent more debt if the credit constraints were removed (see Table 5). However, we 
find that there is a substantial variation in the desired debt across the sample. For 
example, service firms have the lowest average desired debt level, $764,836, and 
manufacturing firms have the highest levels of debt, $3,006,222. Desired debt also 
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varies substantially across the size of small businesses. Small businesses that employ 
more than 99 employees have an estimated desired debt of $5,064,747, but it falls to 
$1,875,420 for firms employing 50 and 99 employees. Similarly, desired debt for S-
corporations is about two-thirds of what C-corporations have. 
Our results indicate that manufacturing firms might increase their debt by nearly 
half if they could borrow more, whereas within the wholesale and service firms the debt 
levels would go up by 27 and 23 percent, respectively. Utilities, transportation, 
insurance, mining, and the retail sectors of small businesses experience no significant 
credit gap. Given that our findings pertain to an era of credit tightening, it is not 
surprising that the manufacturing sector is found to be severely credit constrained 
(Berger, Kyle, and Scalise (2000)). Results for the utility sector may reflect that it is 
usually not affected by general credit-tightening policies, and may resonate with the 
findings of Krishana, Rajan, and Zingales (1999) that utilities require little external 
financing relative to firms in other sectors, by virtue of their natural monopoly status. 
Figure 1 shows that there are distinct differences in the median values of the desired 
debt across industries. Individual series show some skewness, and in some cases the 
long appendages indicate the presence of long tails. The upper and lower quartiles also 





Box-and-whisker plots of desired debt for one-digit industries 
 
































1 = Mining, 2 = Construction, 3 = Manufacturing, 4 = Utilities & Transportation,  
5 = Wholesale Trade, 6 = Retail Trade, 7 = Insurance, and 8 = Service. 
 
 
VII.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
Our findings indicate that credit-constrained small businesses face an average credit gap 
of 20 percent. As expected, firms with limited credit, shorter histories, and poor 
financial statements face tighter credit situations, consistent with various theoretical 
models of credit availability such as Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Stiglitz and Weiss 
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(1981). The magnitude of credit gap varies considerably across industries, size of firm, 
and the nature of business organization. Manufacturing firms face an average credit gap 
of 46 percent, while the credit gap for services and wholesale firms is estimated at 23 
and 27 percent, respectively. Corporations on average have higher credit gaps than 
partnerships or proprietary small businesses. Our study indicates that an effective 
segmentation of small businesses according to their expected credit gaps would be 
essential to alleviating credit crunches and foster entrepreneurship.  
The methodology used to obtain the results accommodates the nonrandom nature 
of the subsample (selection biases) used to estimate firms’ demand for desired debt (i.e., 
firms that have positive debt and are not credit constrained). We achieve this by 
adopting an extension of Heckman’s correction procedure for multiple selections. We 
find that both sources of sample selection bias—the unobserved factors that increase the 
probability of a firm’s holding debt and the unobserved factors that increase the 
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